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Abstract—The unstoppable adoption of cloud and fog 
computing is paving the way to developing innovative services, 
some requiring features not yet covered by either fog or cloud 
computing. Simultaneously, nowadays technology evolution is 
easing the monitoring of any kind of infrastructure, be it large or 
small, private or public, static or dynamic. The fog-to-cloud 
computing (F2C) paradigm recently came up to support foreseen 
and unforeseen services demands while simultaneously benefiting 
from the smart capacities of the edge devices. Inherited from 
cloud and fog computing, a challenging aspect in F2C is security 
provisioning. Unfortunately, security strategies employed by 
cloud computing require computation power not supported by 
devices at the edge of the network, whereas security strategies in 
fog are yet on their infancy. Put this way, in this paper we 
propose Software Defined Network (SDN)-based security 
management architecture based on a master/slave strategy. The 
proposed architecture is conceptually applied to a critical 
infrastructure (CI) scenario, thus analyzing the benefits F2C may 
bring for security provisioning in CIs. 
Keywords—IoT; cloud computing; fog computing; fog-to-cloud 
computing; security; Software Defined Network (SDN); critical 
infrastructures 
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Nowadays, the operation between people and machines is 
being significantly empowered through both innovative 
communication paradigms and new smart devices, such as 
smart phones, tablets or wearables, just to name a few. The 
growth of devices connectivity paved the way to coin the term 
Internet of Things (IoT), standing for ―things‖ communicating 
anywhere, at any time, and for anyone – a ―thing‖ in IoT refers 
to any type of connected device. The explosion of IoT and, in 
particular, the rapid growth of connected users through a large 
variety of heterogeneous devices, fueled the deployment of 
new applications with strict demands in several key aspects, 
such as security, computing power or storage. In order to face 
that set of demands, cloud computing emerged as an on-
demand self-service, scalable, location independent, pay-as-
you-go online computing model, enabling the use of remote 
physical computing resources located at far data centers [1], 
[2]. The outsourcing of data and services processing up to the 
cloud, brings not only economic benefits but also frees users to 
get concerned on related technical aspects. 
However, handling that volume and variety of data, while 
simultaneously providing the velocity demanded by IoT 
applications, requires a new computing paradigm that can 
guarantee low-latency, as well as increased security and 
energy-efficiency, among others. The fog computing paradigm 
[3] has been recently proposed as an extension to cloud 
computing, leveraging a highly distributed set of resources 
located at the edge of the network, bringing computing, storage 
and network capabilities closer to the end-users, what 
unquestionably facilitates to provide characteristics, such as 
low-latency, location awareness, geo-distribution, increased 
data security and real-time processing. Put this way, in IoT 
scenarios, cloud makes centralization while fog makes 
localization. 
Leveraging cloud and fog benefits, fog-to-cloud computing 
(F2C) has been recently proposed [4], as a new computing 
paradigm proposing an innovative hierarchical and distributed 
architecture. In the proposed distributed architecture, users’ 
devices (i.e., edge devices) may collect data to be later 
processed in an either sequential or parallel fashion at fog, 
cloud or both, fueling the creation of a large set of new 
services. The F2C computing model is intended to jointly 
manage cloud and fog resources in a coordinated way, 
demanding for a novel control and management strategy, 
addressing some of the limitations inherent to cloud and fog 
computing. Many challenges are yet unsolved in the F2C 
computing model, from coordinated resources management at 
cloud and fog to the challenges imposed when facing security 
provisioning. This paper focuses on the security aspects for 
F2C, proposing a novel SDN-based security architecture that is 
conceptually applied to a critical infrastructure (CI) scenario, to 
fuel discussion on the envisioned benefits F2C may bring to 
help secure such a highly demanding scenarios. 
It must be highlighted that besides the unsolved security 
issues from the seed cloud and fog computing models, new 
F2C specific security challenges come up. Thus, proposing a 
solution for F2C undoubtedly requires a strong background on 
security aspects both in the cloud and fog scenarios. 
On the cloud area, the outsourcing of service processing 
exposes well-known security aspects requiring wide attention. 
For example, the distance between the end user and the cloud 
resources is not only adding long delays, but also impacting on 
the overall security. On the other hand, although theoretically 
fog should bring more privacy — as a consequence of its 
proximity to end-users — its distributed nature makes fog 
computing to face not only security challenges inherited from 
cloud (shifted from cloud to the edge), but some other inherent 
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to fog computing. First, fog computing brings virtualization 
closer to the users, thus fog computing must also deal with 
security issues related to the virtualization environment as it 
usually happens in cloud computing. Second, recognized the 
distributed strategy adopted by fog computing, authentication 
in different levels turns into one of the main security challenges 
in fog. Indeed, the fact that fog computing shifts some 
computational capabilities, data analysis, data aggregation, data 
filtering and storage to edge devices, drives the edge of the 
network to handle private, sensitive or confidential information 
—such as, personal information or critical infrastructures data. 
Thus, secure communications must be granted in order to 
guarantee data privacy at the edge of the network. Third, there 
is a high heterogeneity in the devices at the edge—nodes, 
servers, gateways, access points, etc.—, what makes the design 
of an architecture granting security provisioning a hard 
challenge. Moreover, we must consider that although 
traditional cloud security protocols may theoretically provide 
some security to fog computing systems, the constraints on 
processing capacities of the edge devices undoubtedly limit the 
efficiency of such existing protocols. On the other hand, 
security initiatives designed for fog computing cannot meet the 
huge amount of processing and storage cloud requirements. In 
addition, the design of secure fogs and clouds with existing 
security architectures and protocols without considering the 
coordinated nature of F2C (interoperability, heterogeneity, 
etc.), may cause additional security problems when considering 
the whole set of resources envisioned in F2C. This is the first 
work dealing with complete security architecture for F2C 
computing systems. 
The challenging question is: how can we design a new 
security architecture providing secure communication, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, mutual fog, cloud and 
nodes authentication, and access control for F2C? In this paper 
we assess that the highly distributed F2C nature can be 
properly managed by using a Software Defined Network 
(SDN) based strategy, leveraging a set of distributed controller 
nodes, through a master-slave strategy. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
related work, Section 3 describes the new SDN-based security 
for F2C, Section 4 presents the obtained results, and finally 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Many recent works have assessed the design of security 
protocols and architectures to secure fog computing and cloud 
computing communications in an independent fashion. 
Nevertheless, none of them considered a coordinated security 
scheme, as demanded by new computing models, such as fog-
to-cloud. In this section, we revisit some relevant works on the 
security area for cloud and fog computing paradigms, 
somehow related to the specific F2C demands. It must be 
highlighted that none of the revisited works are designed to be 
applied to F2C; hence the literature review is intended to learn 
from past efforts in related areas. 
In the way, securing fog and cloud, authors in [5] propose 
identity-based authentication for IoT assuming the central 
database, controllers, gateways and things distributed in a 
hierarchical way. Key characteristics of this proposal are: 
1) controllers use an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key 
establishment method to generate keys; 2) gateways take their 
certificates from the controller; 3) things are registered by 
gateways; and 4) things and gateways go through the 
authentication phase. The proposed solution provides a secure 
hierarchical architecture and protocol for fog and cloud 
communication, although security for inter fog communication 
is not granted. The solution proposed in [6] aims at 
guaranteeing secure end-to-end communications in IoT 
scenarios. The presented architecture is split into device layer, 
fog layer (gateways) and cloud layer, and uses the full initial 
certificate-based Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 
protocol between end-user and smart gateways for 
authentication and authorization. Unlike the work in [5], the 
proposed security architecture only provides a secure inter fog 
communication without considering the security on the 
communication between fog and cloud nodes. The work in [7] 
proposes a fog user/fog server mutual authentication. In this 
architecture, fog users store a long-lived master secret key, 
which allows them to roam through the network and mutually 
authenticate to any fog server under cloud service provider 
authorization. Unfortunately, this work provides security in fog 
communications without remarking cloud security. In [8], a 
gateway-based fog computing (master/slave) for wireless 
sensors and actuator networks is proposed. Similar to the work 
in [7] this work is focused on fog so with no room to be 
applied to cloud, nor to F2C. 
Several solutions already focus on the SDN concept. The 
architecture in [9] includes a device layer (contains sensors for 
data collection), communication layer (includes SDN gateways 
and routers), computing layer (contains a controller with 
accounting and billing mechanisms) and service layer (where 
IoT services are built by developers and operators through 
programming the SDN controllers) for the construction of an 
SDN-based architecture for horizontal IoT. The proposed 
architecture faces fog communications through gateways 
without contemplating cloud in a coordinated way. The work 
in [10] focuses on an SDN approach for securing IoT 
gateways. The proposed architecture includes 3 layers: 1) Edge 
node, running some services at the edge of the network to 
reduce the amount of data to be transferred to the cloud for 
analysis, processing, and storage; 2) SDN controller, 
supporting open-flow switch; and 3) E2E application, bringing 
monitoring capacities for anomaly detection. Although, authors 
only provide security for IoT gateways — without considering 
cloud security — they propose to use a centralized SDN 
controller with no capacity to handle secure mobility issues. 
Authors in [11] propose merging Fog computing and software-
defined networking into the IoT architecture. Authors argue 
that the proposed combined strategy facilitates traffic control, 
resource management, scalability, mobility and real-time data 
delivery. Other challenges addressed by such a combined 
strategy are:  1) SDN controller orchestration untangle fog 
orchestration issues; 2) fog computing would solve scalability 
issues in SDN; 3) fog brings low-latency to the whole IoT 
architecture. However, security provisioning is not discussed in 
that paper. 
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Fig. 1. New SDN-based security architecture.
Taking into account the novelty of F2C computing, this is 
the first paper aimed at designing a solution for security 
provisioning in F2C. The proposed SDN-based solution is the 
first contribution specifically analyzing the characteristics 
imposed by the hierarchical F2C architecture. Indeed, our 
proposal suggests using a F2C controller (in the cloud) as a 
master, and distributed fog-controllers as sub-masters, all 
efficiently managed in a coordinated fashion. To that end a 
protocol must also be designed defining how distinct elements 
in the architecture interact with each other. 
III. THE PROPOSED SDN-BASED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
The coordinated management of fog and cloud resources 
envisioned by F2C computing exacerbates traditional cloud 
security issues, such as authentication, communications 
privacy among F2C layers, confidentiality, or integrity, just to 
name a few. In this section, we introduce the foundations of an 
SDN-based security architecture for F2C computing systems. 
As reported in the state of the art section, applying SDN for 
security provisioning is not a novel approach and some existing 
works already benefit from the decoupling concept brought by 
SDN [12]. The strategy floated in the paper leverages the SDN 
concept by proposing a centralized F2C controller in cloud, as 
a master, and several distributed controllers covering the 
different fogs. Fig. 1 illustrates the proposed SDN-based 
security architecture, setting four levels, as follows: 
1) F2C controller (Master): A centralized master 
controller located at cloud, is responsible for managing, 
monitoring and granting a secure communication in the 
architecture. This F2C controller gives authorization to all 
components in the architecture to provide coordinated secure 
management and communication among them. 
2) Control Areas (Sub-master1): We consider a distributed 
security control divided into distinct control areas, each one 
containing one Control Area Unit associated to one fog. 
Therefore, each Control Area Unit is responsible for 
implementing the required control functionalities [13]. They 
are responsible for the establishment of secure coordinated 
management and communication between fogs in different 
areas, as well as fogs to cloud, both requiring F2C controller 
authorization. The sub-master1 controllers are distributed 
according to each fog location, enabling a mobility-aware 
architecture. 
3) Cluster-head (Sub-master2): This is an edge device 
endorsed with high capacity, in terms of networking, 
computing, and storage, if compared to other edge devices 
located in the same area. Each selected sub-master2 is a 
middleware between nodes (IoT edge devices) and control 
areas on different fogs and is able to make data processing at 
the edge of the network according to its resource capacity. 
4) Nodes (Slaves): Located at the edge of the network, the 
slave layer is formed by the IoT devices, which may include 
both end-user mobile devices and deployed devices, such as 
fixed sensors. 
The different architectural levels must coordinately operate 
to successfully guarantee security provisioning. To that end, a 
formal handshaking protocol must be defined, setting the 
formal procedures for systems communication. Next, we 
introduce the main rationale for the protocol performance. In 
the proposed architecture, control areas (sub-master1) must 
register and authenticate to F2C controller in order to control 
fogs in different areas. In a similar way, each cluster-head (sub-
master2), positioned in distinct fogs, must register in control 
areas, while nodes must register in the cluster-head. In the 
registration phase, we assume all control-areas to be registered 
at the F2C controller through a long-term secret-key, so they 
can control the distributed fogs. Simultaneously, each cluster-
head is also registered in its corresponding distributed 
controller. After the registration phase, each control-area takes 
over security management in the distributed fogs, hence 
reducing the usual complexity when done at cloud. It is worth 
mentioning that, as illustrated in Fig. 1 by the dashed line, the 
cluster-head may communicate directly with the F2C controller 
in some specific situations (as described in the following 
paragraphs), thus also requiring the registration of cluster-
heads in the F2C controller. 
After the registration phase, the communication between 
distinct components of this architecture may be performed 
hierarchically, turning into three distinct categories, as 
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introduced in our previous work in [14]. Here, we discuss the 
proposed architecture in an illustrative smart city scenario in 
order to validate the distributed controllers approach. 
In the smart city scenario shown in Fig. 2, we assume a 
centralized F2C controller located at the cloud owned by the 
smart city. The F2C controller is responsible for managing, 
controlling and providing a secure communication for all smart 
city components. We assume a global topology including 
distributed controllers deployed in a traffic light, a store (fog1), 
a gas station, and a bus station. These distributed controllers 
would authenticate and take authorization from the F2C 
controller in the registration and initialization step. Therefore, 
all controllers are able to inter-communicate in order to provide 
secure manageable communication for all smart city 
components, deployed in distinct fogs. For the sake of 
simplicity, we consider that in each fog, the device with more 
capacity in terms of network, storage and computing is the one 
selected as cluster-head. 
In Fig. 2, fog 1 is a store, where fog users’ devices can be 
controlled and authenticated by the corresponding control area 
unit deployed in the store. Let’s suppose a fog 1 user wants to 
communicate securely with a fog user in fog 4. Indeed, they 
can communicate in a secure and manageable way through the 
corresponding store control area unit and bus station control-
area unit. These distributed controllers facilitate fog to fog 
authentication and communication. Hence, assuming that a 
fog 1 user in the store wants to take information about bus 
arrivals, using our distributed controllers, the user can get 
secure information through the corresponding control-area unit 
in the store (this control-area unit has secure inter 
communication with bus control area unit). In another 
example, let’s assume fog 2 to be built upon a set of cars 
moving in the same direction (see red cars in Fig. 2) and fog 3 
built upon another set of cars all moving in the same direction, 
but perpendicular to cars in fog 2 (see gray cars in Fig. 2). 
Within each of these fogs, one car shall be selected as a cluster-
head and fog 2 and fog 3 can communicate in a secure 
manageable way through their respective control-area unit 
(traffic-light). Furthermore, whether the corresponding control-
area unit (traffic-light) gets compromised, attacked or down, 
the selected cluster-head, for instance in fog 2, which obtained 
a master key to directly communicate to the F2C controller 
during the registration step, makes use of this controller to get a 
nearest and safest control-area unit (suppose gas station or bus 
station control-area unit). Therefore, fog 2 would be controlled 
and managed by one of them. 
Moreover, the proposed architecture also enables the fog 
users in fog 4 to be authenticated to the smart city cloud 
through the bus control area unit with less authentication delay. 
Indeed, by deploying distributed controllers for fogs 
management, we decrease the distance between fogs and cloud 
which can be helpful for achieving less authentication delay as 
well as higher security by avoiding known attacks, such as man 
in the middle. Another privilege of distributed controllers is 
secure mobility and handover. 
 
Fig. 2. Smart city scenario. 
For instance, assume that fog 2, fog 3, fog 4 and fog 5 are 
on the move. With the deployment of distributed controllers, 
we are able to manage secure mobility and handover through 
control area units inter communication. 
IV. REVIEWING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES SECURITY 
NEEDS 
It is widely recognized and largely reported the relevance 
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) have for the functioning of a 
society. A CI can be defined as a set of assets, be it either 
physical or virtual, playing a vital role in providing country’s 
needs, to the extent that its incapacity or destruction would 
have a devastating impact on security, economy or public 
health. There are many infrastructures that may be categorized 
as CI, such as (with no aim to be an exclusive list) emergency 
services, water supply systems, agriculture and food, 
government, defense industry, information technology and 
telecommunication, healthcare, banking system, energy, 
transportation system, chemical industry, postal services, 
national airports or military systems. Indeed, breaking security 
vulnerabilities in a CI causes critical information leaks and 
terrible disasters in normal countries operation. 
Therefore a comprehensive and exhaustive identification of 
the key security requirements in critical infrastructures is a 
must for any country to set the proper procedures for security 
provisioning. 
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Fig. 3. Device-cloud authentication (Scenario 1). 
 
Fig. 4. End-to-end authentication (Scenario 2). 
In fact, we categorize most common security requirements 
in critical infrastructures into [15]: strong network security 
management, strong identification and authentication 
mechanism, firm security policy, data confidentiality, forensics 
analysis, operational technology (OT) protection, OT network 
protection, secure communication channel, cascading affect 
protection, anomaly behavior detection mechanism, high 
network traffic detection mechanism (for DoS/DDoS attacks), 
security information and event management (SIEM), 
antimalware and antiviruses  protection mechanism, hardware 
security, data privacy, data integrity, and IT network 
protection. 
From a security perspective CIs use to share a common, 
distributed, coordinated scenario, intended to be an extremely 
secure framework including global policies and solutions to 
guarantee the required performance. The distributed policy 
defined in the SDN-based security architecture proposed in this 
paper seems to be a proper solution to be applied in CI 
scenarios. Indeed, the centralized and distributed controllers in 
our architecture will help CIs: 1) ease components 
authentication; 2) ease systems authorization through a master-
slave strategy; and 3) provide a coordinated management 
between different CIs to communicate in a secure way. 
V. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section presents preliminary architecture evaluations 
aiming at validating the benefits of the proposed SDN-based 
architecture for security provisioning. To that end, we put the 
focus on analyzing the delay required for authentication 
purposes, considering a traditional strategy based on cloud 
authentication and another one inferred from the proposed 
SDN-based security architecture. Two scenarios are analyzed, 
one demanding fog-cloud authentication and the other one 
demanding fog-fog (end-to-end) authentication. 
Scenario 1. Fog-cloud authentication: Let us assume a 
temperature-sensor) in a nuclear power station wants to 
authenticate with the nuclear power cloud for communication. 
Two distinct approaches may be deployed, as illustrated in 
Fig. 3. A traditional cloud authentication scheme is shown in 
red-lines whilst our proposal is shown in brown-lines. 
The traditional authentication procedure performs as 
follows: 
 Step 1: Fog node (temperature-sensor) exchange 
authentication messages with cloud (nuclear-power 
cloud). 
 Step 2: Temperature sensor and nuclear power 
datacenter are authenticated. 
On the other hand, the proposed authentication procedure 
performs as follows: 
 Step 1*: Temperature-sensor exchange authentication 
messages with the Control-Area unit is linked to. As 
Control-Area units take permission from the F2C 
controller to control distributed Fogs during registration 
phase, the controller can do authentication to Fogs with 
their primitive F2C controller authorization. 
 Step 2*: Nuclear power cloud and temperature-sensor 
are authenticated for communication. The sensor 
receives acknowledgment from cloud. 
Scenario 2. End-to-end authentication: For a scenario 
requiring end-to-end authentication, such as a power system 
willing to establish a secure communication with a hospital, we 
illustrate in Fig. 4 the traditional authentication in red-line and 
the proposed authentication scheme in brown-line. 
The traditional end-to-end authentication procedure 
performs as follows: 
 Step 1: Fog 1 (Power system) exchange authentication 
messages with the cloud aiming at setting secure 
communication with Fog N (Hospital). 
 Step 2: Fog N authenticate from cloud to have 
communication with Fog 1. 
 Step 3: Power system and hospital may establish secure 
communication after authentication. 
The proposed end-to-end authentication procedure 
performs as follows: 
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 Step 1*: Power system exchange authentication 
messages with its Control-Area unit in order to establish 
secure communication with the hospital. 
 Step 2*: Hospital authenticate from its Control-Area 
unit to establish secure communication with the power 
system. Is it worth mentioning that, as in Scenario 1, all 
Control-Area units are already registered in F2C 
controller, therefore, distributed controllers has 
permission to authenticate Fogs with no need to reach 
out to the cloud. 
 Step 3*: Power system and hospital may set a secure 
communication after authentication. 
In both scenarios, the deployment of the proposed strategy 
for authentication leverages the low delay authentication 
provided by the distributed controllers located close to the end-
users. Indeed, Table 1 shows that the authentication time in fog 
nodes are significantly lower than the authentication in cloud 
when using traditional schemes, such as the SSL 
Authentication Protocol (SAP). The estimated delays for both 
fog and cloud authentication were based on works in the 
literature, such as [16], [17]. Consequently, Table 2 shows the 
estimated delays for the two scenarios analyzed, clearly 
highlighting the benefits in terms of reduced delay when 
applying the SDN-based security architecture. 
From the obtained results we may infer the effects the 
proposed architecture may have in particular CI scenarios. 
Recognized the significance authentication has in CI scenarios, 
we may state that according to our evaluation, the reduced 
delay for both fog and cloud authentication brought by our 
architecture will be extremely beneficial in CI scenarios. Let us 
consider two well-known CI scenarios, such as a hospital 
(eHealth sector) and a train provider (transport sector). In both 
scenarios low delay authentication is key to guarantee the real 
time performance, mandatory in both domains. For instance, let 
us assume a patient needs to communicate privately with 
his/her doctor. According to the solution proposed in this 
paper, the authentication phase would be executed at both the 
distributed controllers (fogs) and the centralized controller 
(cloud), thus with a strong impact on delay reduction. Moving 
to the transport scenario, a train must communicate with 
several stations to check traffic and interlocking systems to 
avoid accidents. This requires mutual train and stations 
authentication with very low delay to guarantee a fast reaction, 
thus preventing undesired disasters to come. The SDN-based 
security architecture proposed in this paper leveraging the 
deployment of distributed controllers, would undoubtedly help 
decrease the authentication delay, thus contributing to a more 
secure performance. 
It is also worth noticing that the proposed security 
architecture would not impact only on individual CI scenarios 
but also on the communication among them. Indeed, CIs are 
usually dependent each other, so secure communication among 
them is a must. For example, hospital infrastructure is strongly 
dependent on the power provider, same for a train company, or 
a military system with the emergency control system. To make 
dependencies reliable and efficient, a secure communications 
strategy must be deployed among them. 
TABLE I. AUTHENTICATION DELAY COMPARISON IN FOG AND CLOUD 
Location Latency 
Fog authentication ~ 300 ms 
Cloud authentication ~ 1000 ms 
TABLE II. AUTHENTICATION DELAY COMPARISON IN THE TWO 
SCENARIOS ANALYZED 
Scenario Latency 
 Cloud strategy SDN-based strategy 
Fog-cloud authentication ~ 1000 ms ~ 300 ms 
end-to-end authentication ~ 2000 ms ~ 600 ms 
In this section the proposed architecture has been 
preliminary validated in terms of delay. However, beyond the 
benefits introduced in response time, we envision many other 
advantages, particularly referring to a critical task, such as the 
complexity brought by managing huge centralized databases 
located at cloud. Assuming an IoT scenario where thousands of 
heterogeneous devices are ever asking for communication, 
keeping strong security guarantees requires a huge database to 
be managed. The proposed distributed architecture relieves the 
complexity overhead introduced by such a management, 
through the deployment of local databases at fog premises. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Distinct network paradigms such as Cloud computing, fog 
computing and, in special, the recently proposed combined 
fog-to-cloud (F2C) computing are imposing new security 
challenges in distinct aspects. This paper addresses security 
aspects in F2C computing by illustrating, in terms of 
authentication delay, how isolated fog and cloud security 
solutions are not sufficient to guarantee the deployment of a 
trustable F2C coordinated management solution. In order to 
contribute to that problem, we introduce an SDN-based 
security architecture supported by master/slave strategies 
augmented by deploying a set of well-defined distributed 
controllers. The paper argues that through the deployment of 
this strategy, we can decrease the authentication delay in both 
fog and cloud communications. Finally, we conclude assessing 
that there are still many challenges to sort out, thus strong 
efforts must be allocated by the scientific community to 
provide a solution addressing the specific requirements brought 
by the envisioned F2C scenario. 
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